The dialogue on data protection has so far been dominated by European and American voices. There are currently a few international conventions in place such as the Council of Europe's 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic processing of personal data, the 1980 OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data , which apply to 30 OECD countries, and the EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, which binds EU member states but has had some impact on non-European countries due to the restriction on cross border flow of information.
I. Introduction
Countries around the world are shifting invariably toward information-based societies. The way we work, interact and enjoy our leisure time has changed dramatically since the emergence of the Internet. Both private and public sectors are increasingly offering services over the Internet, be it e-commerce or egovernment services, which require collection of an individual's information on a scale that has thus far been unprecedented. The increasing interconnection of the economies around the world further exacerbates this phenomenon. For example, it is perfectly normal for a German citizen living in Japan to buy a book from the US Amazon website and for US Amazon to share the buyer's information internally with its Japan branch or its related suppliers and agents.
The burning questions are how personal data can be collected, acquired, stored, used and communicated in a fair and secure manner in one's home jurisdiction and also whenever one's personal data is transferred to other countries? As the above example shows, the concept of "home jurisdiction" can sometimes be blurred which also highlights the urgent need to have an internationally acceptable standard of protecting personal data.
The need to protect personal data and the rationales for doing so are not new; they have been discussed since the 1960s. The European countries were the first to start enacting comprehensive legislation. This caused fears in an increasingly interconnected global economy that European countries with "higher" standards of data protection would enact "borders" and prevent the flow of information to other countries which did not have equivalent standards of data protection.
Accordingly, work commenced on international conventions, the result of which was that the international community agreed that protecting personal data was necessary for the safeguarding of an individual's privacy. The object of the Council of Europe's "1981 CoE Convention", 1 as expressed in Article 1, is to ensure "respect for (an individual's) rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of personal data relating to him". The Preamble to the OECD Guidelines 1980 2 states that "Member countries considered it necessary to develop Guidelines which would help to harmonise national privacy legislation and, while upholding such human rights, would at the same time prevent interruptions in international flows of data". While neither of these international instruments defines what "privacy" actually means, they both concede that privacy is a fundamental human right and data protection legislation is one way to protect this right. This article will seek to answer the above questions. Part II will examine the EU model of data protection by reviewing the underlying values that the legislation seeks to serve; the principles set out in the Directive and how these differ from the earlier instruments; and the strengths and the weaknesses of the EU model. Part III will examine the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 using the same methodology as in Part II. It will conclude by reviewing the weaknesses of using the comparative method to analyse the EU model and APEC Privacy Framework 2004. Are these two completely different international instruments? Is this a case of comparing apples and oranges? Part IV will discuss the impact of the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 on its Member Economies to assess whether or not there has been, or is likely to be, a "trading down" of standards.
Part V will offer thoughts on the future of the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 and its role in international data protection legislation.
II. The EU Model

A. The Players
The EU currently comprises 27 Member States, 13 many of whom wield significant economic power in their own right. Taken as a single trading bloc, the EU which is home to nearly half a billion consumers is a formidable force to be reckoned with.
Europe has had a long legislative experience in enacting data protection legislation. At a national level, Sweden was the first country in the world to enact data protection laws in 1973. West Germany, Denmark, Austria, France, Norway and Luxemburg followed suit in the late 1970s. However, there were also countries such as the United Kingdom, sceptical of the concept of a "privacy right", that did not appear to have any immediate plans to legislate on this area of the law.
14 At a pan-European level, the European countries realized that diverging standards (or lack of) data protection laws among member states could adversely affect the free flow of information.
In the 1970s, the Council of Europe, a pan-European intergovernmental organization, began work on what would eventually become the 1981 CoE Convention. 15 Countries outside of Europe soon became concerned about the potential of data protection laws impacting upon international trade and also started work on the drafting of the OECD Guidelines.
Before the article examines the various international data protection instruments that emerged, it is illustrative at this juncture to examine what prompted countries to legislate the processing of personal data.
B. Rationales for Protecting the Processing of Personal Data
The catalysts of and the values behind data protection legislation are varied and complex and a detailed examination is beyond the scope of this article.
16 13 Member States are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 14 In fact, the United Kingdom only enacted its Data Protection Act in 1984 pursuant to its obligations under the 1981 CoE Convention. 15 The treaty was adopted in 1980 and was opened for ratification on January 1981. Supra footnote 1 16 For a more detailed discussion, see Lee However, there is international consensus that data protection laws are necessary to protect an individual's right to privacy. 17 Broadly speaking, the catalysts for data protection legislation can be categorized in the following manner: (1) technological and organizational developments (2) public fears about these developments; and (3) the nature of other legal rules which form the normative basis for such laws. It is arguably the third category that shapes the legislative response to the first and second categories. Without a compelling normative basis, it is difficult for a society to articulate what is actually at stake and there is little incentive for the legislature to act and address the problem. This is illustrated by the European experience. Europeans have experienced first hand the dangers associated with uncontrolled use of personal information from their experiences under World War II-era fascist governments and post-War communist regimes where the disclosure of race, religion or political affiliation led to arrests of otherwise law-abiding citizens. In the wake of these atrocities, fundamental human rights were enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948; 18 in particular, the right to a private and family life was specifically recognized in Article 12. Europe also went on in 1950 to adopt the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 19 where Article 8 similarly protected the right to private life. The right to private life is also protected under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in 1966. 20 Some European countries also had values such as human dignity, personality and privacy entrenched in their Constitutions. For instance in Sweden, Section 2 of the Instrument of Government Act of 1974, 21 which is a Constitutional document provides for the protection of individual privacy. Section 3 also provides for a right to protection of personal integrity in relation to automatic data processing. Section 71 of the Danish Constitution of 1953 22 provides for the inviolability of personal liberty. In Germany, the right of informational selfdetermination set out in Articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the Federal Republic's Basic Law declares that personal rights (Persönlichkeitsrecht) to freedom are inviolable. 23 It is likely that European countries were the first to respond to the threat that automatic data processing poses to privacy because of these international and domestic obligations coupled with public sentiment that backed the protection of human rights after World War II. 17 See Part II (C) (1) and (2) How did Europe go about enacting data protection legislation? Academics have identified three main waves of legislative activity. 24 The first wave of legislative activity which took place in Europe in the early 1970s was a response to the emergence of computers and the rise of automated information processing by governments and the business sector. The concern at that time was to counter the centralization of large-scale data banks which were perceived as a threat to the individual's right to private life. Countries such as Sweden, Germany and Austria established regulatory bodies to oversee computer and data processing and required such activities to be subject to registration and licensing.
The second wave occurred in the late 1970s. The fears of a Big Brother centralized "data-bank society" were replaced as governments and businesses' data processing capabilities became decentralized. Instead of a means to regulate technology, the protection of a citizen's privacy rights became the focus of legislative activity and in countries such as France, Norway and Denmark, commissions oriented their tasks toward helping citizens to exercise their rights.
The third wave signalled a shift toward a more participatory phase where the right to informational self determination was emphasized. The individual's rights to access personal data that was held by organizations were strengthened and laws were amended, for instance, granting the right to compensation to the individual whose rights were breached.
This approach of limiting data movement on human rights grounds in turn sparked off different fears in the form of economic concerns such as the fettering of trade. This gave rise to the development of standards for the use and dissemination of personal data or data protection standards which sought to balance the competing interests at stake.
C. The Directive -A Comprehensive Data Protection Regime and More
In order to fully appreciate the comprehensive nature of the Directive and its influence on the issue of transborder flows of personal data, it is necessary to briefly review the other international instruments that pre-dated the Directive, namely the 1981 CoE Convention and the OECD Guidelines.
The following sections (1) and (2) will review the objectives of each instrument, its principles and its position on transborder flows of personal data.
The 1981 CoE Convention
The Preamble highlights the Council of Europe's concern to ensure that the increase of automatic processing did not negatively impact on an individual's rights and fundamental freedoms in particular the right to privacy. At the same time, the Council recognized that "it is necessary to reconcile the fundamental values of the respect for privacy and the free flow of information between peoples."
The basic principles set out in the Convention are:
(1) fair and lawful obtaining and processing of personal data; 25 (2) storage of data only for specified purposes; (3) personal data should not be used in ways incompatible with those specified purposes; (4) personal data should be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which the data are stored; (5) personal data should be accurate and where necessary kept up to date; (6) personal data should be preserved in identifiable form for no longer than necessary; (7) special categories 26 of data may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides appropriate safeguards; (8) there should be adequate security for personal data; and (9) personal data should be available to be accessed by individuals who have rights of rectification and erasure.
Apart from the principles relating to the special category of sensitive data and the storage of personal data for no longer than is necessary, the other principles are fairly uncontroversial and have been accepted and echoed in latter international instruments. On the issue of transborder data flows, Article 12(3) provided that Member States can prohibit or subject transborder flows of personal data to conditions if the other party does not provide an "equivalent protection".
However, the effect of the 1981 CoE Convention as a means to regulate the international flow of personal data was fairly limited. It is important to note that the Convention is not a self-executing instrument; Member States have to first sign and then ratify the treaty for it to have any force. Second, the Council of Europe does not have a legal structure to ensure proper enforcement of the Convention. This means that ratification per se did not equate a common minimum standard of data protection. Third, the question of data transfers to noncontracting states was left to national law. 27 This had the effect of undermining the mutual confidence amongst ratifiers of the Convention because "If country A transfers data to country B, the fact that both are parties to the Convention doesn't help if country B is free to allow a further transfer to country C which has no data protection law". 28 However, this problem was rectified subsequently. In 2001, the Council adopted an additional protocol, the "Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 25 Personal data is defined as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual", see Article 2(a). 26 Article 6 provides "Personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or sexual life, may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to personal data relating to criminal convictions." 27 See Article 12. 28 Bainbridge, The EC Data Protection Directive (London: Butterworths, 1996) at 10.
regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows". 29 Article 1 establishes the function of supervisory authorities in each Member State and Article 2 deals with transborder flows of personal data to a recipient which is not subject to the jurisdiction of a Party to the Convention. It establishes the requirement of "adequacy".
The 
OECD Guidelines
The OECD is an international organization which has 30 Member Countries including the founding Western European countries, the North American countries (Canada, the USA), Mexico, Japan and Australia.
Bennett & Raab (2003) describes the OECD as the arena in which the first transatlantic conflicts over privacy protection took place. 31 The conflict boiled down to the American view that information flow should rarely be impeded and the suspicion that the Europeans were in fact using data protection concerns to cover an ulterior trade-protectionist motivation. The Europeans on the other hand viewed the American position as a means to protect USA's domination in the global marketplace.
This struggle is reflected in the preface of the OECD Guidelines that highlights the differing attitudes toward privacy and the need to reconcile "fundamental but competing values such as privacy and the free flow of information" so as to "advance the free flow of information between Member countries and to avoid the creation of unjustified obstacles to the development of economic and social relations among Member countries".
Despite the above struggle between competing interests, the principles in the OECD Guidelines do not differ dramatically from those in the 1981 CoE Convention.
They are: Collection Limitation, Data Quality, Purpose Specification, Use Limitation, Security Safeguards, Openness, Individual Participation and Accountability. This was partly due to the close contact that the OECD Expert Group maintained with the corresponding organ of the Council of Europe.
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Unlike the 1981 CoE Convention, the OECD Guidelines do not make any distinction between normal data and sensitive data. The Committee reached the conclusion that it was probably not possible to identify a set of data which is universally regarded as being "sensitive" due to different cultural values. 33 The Principle of "Openness" was also introduced as a prerequisite for the Individual Participation Principle, the rationale being that "for the latter principle to be effective, it must be possible in practice to acquire information about the collection, storage or use of personal data".
Such means must also be "readily available" so that individuals are able to obtain the information without unreasonable cost.
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There are also two major differences between the instruments. First, the OECD Guidelines were voluntary and did not impose any penalties for non-adoption or non-compliance whereas the 1981 CoE Convention was legally binding. Second, the 1981 CoE Convention only applied to automated data processing whereas the Guidelines applied to personal data regardless of the processing medium.
As regards the transborder flow of information, while section 17 of the OECD Guidelines echoes Article 12(3) of the 1981 CoE Convention in that Member Countries may impose restrictions if the other Member Country does not provide "equivalent protection", section 18 adds the admonition that Member Countries should "avoid developing laws, policies and practices in the name of the protection of privacy and individual liberties which would create obstacles to transborder flows of personal data that would exceed requirements for such protection."
Core Principles of Data Protection Laws
From the provisions of the 1981 CoE Convention and the OECD Guidelines, a common set of core principles can be extracted. This has been described as consisting of the following:
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(1) Personal information should be collected by fair and lawful means.
(2) The amount of personal information collected should be limited to what is necessary to achieve the purpose for which the data is gathered and processed. (3) Personal information should be collected for specified, lawful or legitimate purpose and not be processed incompatibly from those purposes. (4) Secondary use of personal information should occur only with the consent of the person or by authority of the law.
(5) Personal information should be relevant, accurate and complete for the purposes for which it is processed. (6) Security measures should be taken to protect personal information. (7) Persons should be informed of and given access to information relating to them and to be able to rectify the information if necessary. By the late 1980s, only 17 countries had signed the 1981 CoE Convention and only 10 had ratified it. The OECD Guidelines being completely voluntary in nature were seen as a means "to justify self-regulatory approaches rather than as a method to promote good data protection practices throughout the advanced industrial world".
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The EU became increasingly concerned that discrepancies in data protection would impede the free flow of personal information throughout the EU and could obstruct the creation of the Internal Market which was due to be completed by 1992. The EU Commission decided that it was justified in proposing a Directive on the basis of Article 100(a) (now repealed) of the EC Treaty to ensure the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market. "Whereas the object of the national laws on the processing of personal data is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, which is recognized both in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the general principles of Community law; whereas, for that reason, the approximation of those laws must not result in any lessening of the protection they afford but must, on the contrary, seek to ensure a high level of protection in the Community." [Emphasis added]
Recital 2 emphasizes that "data-processing systems are designed to serve man; whereas they must, whatever the nationality or residence of natural persons, respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy…" 36 Bennett & Raab supra note 24, Chapter 4 at 77. 37 Bennett & Raab, supra note 24, Chapter 4 at 78. 38 For an illustration as to how Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 6, has been interpreted, see Von Hannover v Germany (2000), (Application no. 59320/00), date of judgment 24 June 2004 , a decision by the European Court of Human Rights. The case concerned the publication of photographs by tabloids in Germany of Princess Von Hannover. The Court was asked to decide between the competing rights of the right to privacy as argued by the Applicant and the tabloids' right to the freedom of expression that the German Government said it was bound to uphold. The Court eventually decided in favor of the Applicant after it used a balancing test and concluded that the "contribution" to society in this instance was not sufficient for the right of expression to triumph over one's individual right to privacy.
Another aim of the Directive is to ensure the free flow of information throughout the Single Market by the harmonization of Member States' rules.
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The general rules of data protection are similar to the information privacy principles found in the OECD Guidelines. The additional principles are the explicit requirements of "legitimate data processing" in Article 7, the prohibition against processing sensitive data in Article 8, the requirement for providing exemptions for the purposes of freedom of expression in Article 9 and the right of a person not to be subject to a solely automated decision in Article 15.
Article 15 provides:
"Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc."
The Directive and Article 15 in particular are remarkable in that they pre-dated the Internet boom and the full explosive force of the processing of personal information via e-commerce. Article 15 tackles the problem of automated profiling practices which can be used for example in credit ratings or social welfare entitlements and sets out limitations to such practices. 40 While other international instruments do not have an equivalent provision, it has been argued 41 that Article 15 signifies the protection of human integrity and dignity in an ever increasing automated world by ensuring that the individual is given a right to know (and presumably object to) the logic involved in the automatic processing of data concerning him or rather his "data shadow".
More importantly, it is the very nature of the Directive that is its greatest strength. The Directive is binding on all Member States. It is, however, important to note that the Directive does not extend to areas which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union 42 and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence, state security and criminal law. 43 The Directive apart from setting principles for its Member States also provides a complete regulatory framework for its Member States to emulate. For instance, the Directive deals with the methods by which the principles are to be enforced in national law in "Chapter III Judicial Remedies, Liability and Sanctions". damage as a result of an unlawful processing operation a right to receive compensation from the controller for the damage suffered.
The Directive further specifies the nature and function of a Member State's supervisory authority. Article 28 states that one or more public authorities are responsible for monitoring the application within its territory of the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive. Bennett & Raab (2003) observe that the provisions of Article 28 gave supervisory authorities a greater range of powers and responsibilities than had existed within many European data protection regimes. 44 Articles 29 and 30 go on to establish an advisory Working Party from the supervisory authorities in each Member State. The Working Party is expected to give the "commission advice on divergences among national laws and on the level of protection of third countries in respect of Transborder data flows."
Unlike the OECD Guidelines or 1981 CoE Convention which do not require their signatories to impose export restrictions on third countries, the Directive further requires Member States to take measures to prevent any transfer of data to a third country that does not meet the adequacy requirement set out in Article 25 unless exceptions or derogations can be claimed, for instance, when the data subject gives his unambiguous consent to the data transfer or when the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third party. 45 It is important to highlight that the Directive does not require an "equivalent" standard of data protection, merely an "adequate" level of protection. This is to combat the concern that countries may seek to find "data havens" and thus circumvent the Directive. Article 26(2) defines "adequate level of protection" as follows: "The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or a set of data transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in those countries."
The Working Party established under Article 29 has produced papers to aid in the interpretation of Articles 25 and 26. These are: 
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Of these, WP 12 is the most comprehensive and provides a framework of substantive requirements that a given data protection regime must fulfil in order to achieve the standard of adequacy.
WP 12 suggests any meaningful analysis of "adequate protection" must involve an assessment of the content of the rules applicable and an assessment of the means for ensuring their effective application. The content principles are briefly:
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(1) purpose limitation; (2) data quality and proportionality; (3) transparency; (4) security; (5) rights of access, rectification and opposition; (6) restrictions on onward transfers; (7) special handling of sensitive data; (8) possibility to opt out from direct marketing; and (9) special rules for automated decision making.
The enforcement principles are briefly:
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(1) to deliver a good level of compliance with the rules; (2) to help data subjects in the exercise of their rights; and (3) to provide appropriate redress for the injured party where the rules are not complied with.
During the process of making an assessment of adequacy, the Commission will usually consult the Working Party and take into consideration its advice; additionally, it will engage independent expert consultants. The process can be lengthy and complex --as demonstrated by the assessment of Australia's data protection regime, an assessment which started in 2001 51 and has gone on in fits 47 Ibid. and starts for almost six years and which still has not yet resulted in a formal decision by the EU Commission.
As can be seen, it is quite an involved task be it for the relevant National Data Protection Authority or the EU Commission to rule on the adequacy of a third country.
It is precisely because the Directive is so comprehensive and all encompassing, that herein also lies the difficulty. Apart from this, the Directive itself is a complex instrument --there are 72 "where-as" in the recital which states the policy intentions behind the Directive. Its principles are also not set out plainly as in the 1981 CoE Convention or the OECD Guidelines. This makes it difficult for the average reader to comprehend in what way and how the Directive protects his privacy rights.
In fact, a recent survey carried out in 2003 confirmed this. Amongst the findings were that 68% of EU citizens were not aware of independent authorities that monitored the application of data protection laws, only 32% of EU citizens were aware of their access and rectification rights, only 42% were aware that data processors were obliged to provide information such as their identity and the purpose of data collection. This is illustrated by the UK case of Durant v FSA. 54 In this case, the Applicant was a customer of Barclays Bank. He had unsuccessfully sued the bank previously and wanted to commence litigation against them again. He sought to obtain documents from the FSA which it obtained during its investigation of the bank. The Applicant claimed that the documents were personal data and sought access to them under section 7 of the UK Data Protection Act 1998 which implemented the Directive. The Applicant submitted that a broad interpretation of "personal data" should cover any information retrieved as a result of a search under the Applicant's name, anything in the bank's file which had his name on it or from which he could be identified or from which it was possible to discern a connection with him. On that basis, Counsel for the Applicant argued that his letters of complaint to the FSA and the documentation they generated were his personal data because he was the source of the material.
The UK Court of Appeal, however, disagreed with the Applicant and gave a narrow interpretation of the meaning of "personal data" under section 1 (1) personal data held by another extends only to information about the individual that affects his personal or family life, business or professional capacity.
It has been reported 55 that the European Commission has notified the UK Government that the Data Protection Act 1998 has failed to conform to the Directive and in particular that the definition of "personal data" adopted by the court in Durant was too restrictive. To date, the Commission has not made the enquiry public and it is too early to say how this will all play out. 56 As noted earlier, the Directive contains a groundbreaking requirement set out in Article 25 that prohibits the cross border transfer of data to countries that do not meet the adequacy requirement. It is arguably this particular article that has caused the international community to take heed of the Directive and its implications on their respective domestic legislation.
However, in the first report regarding the implementation 57 of the Directive, the EU Commission notes that Articles 25 and 26 have been implemented in varying fashions. On the one hand, some Member States allow the data controller to make the adequacy assessment with very little input from the State or national supervisory authority. On the other hand, some Member States require all transfers to be submitted to the national supervisory authority for authorization despite the exceptions set out in the Directive. 58 The EU Commission report recognizes that an overly strict approach would create "a gap between law and practice which is damaging to the credibility of the Directive and to Community law in general."
59 It concludes the report by calling for the simplification of the conditions for international transfers. It is submitted that this is perhaps the logical way to proceed in the light of the enormous amount of data processing that has become part and parcel of the way in which we conduct our daily activities today.
III. The APEC Privacy Framework 2004
A. The Players APEC is an inter-governmental grouping of Pacific Rim economies. Unlike the WTO or other multilateral trade bodies, APEC has no treaty obligations required of its participants. Neither does it have any formal institutions beyond regular meetings. As such, it is important to bear in mind that decisions made within APEC are reached by consensus and commitments are undertaken on a voluntary basis.
APEC has 21 Member Economies 60 which account for more than a third of the world's population (2.6 billion people), over 50% of world GDP (US$ 19, 254 55 billion) and in excess of 41% of world trade. APEC also represents the most economically dynamic region in the world having generated nearly 70% of global economic growth in its first ten years. 61 Member Economies are at different stages in their recognition of privacy rights in their legislation. 62 The following is not meant to be an exhaustive list but to illustrate the diversity between Member Economies. Countries like Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Korea, Taiwan and Japan have legislative regimes that regulate both private and public sectors and, apart from Taiwan and Japan, have established data privacy agencies. Most countries have segmented legislative coverage, for instance Thailand has data privacy rules covering the government sector, Singapore has opted for a voluntary self-regulatory scheme for the private sector but has not enacted specific data protection legislation for the public sector, the USA has comprehensive legislation for federal agencies but has chosen to enact sector specific legislation for the private sector. Malaysia is in the process of enacting comprehensive data protection laws. Some countries like the Philippines, Mexico and China recognize a right to privacy in their constitutions but have not enacted general data protection laws.
It is in the context of this diverse background that the APEC Electronic Commerce Steering Group (ECSG) began development of an APEC Privacy Therefore, while the importance of informational privacy is acknowledged, it is in the context of encouraging the growth of e-commerce rather than the need to protect basic human rights and dignities. 65 In fact, the Framework disapproves of regulatory systems that unnecessarily restrict the flow of information as this could adversely impact on global businesses and economies. Instead, APEC recognizes the need to develop new systems "for protecting information privacy that account for these new realities in the global environment." 66 This is arguably not a surprising conclusion. While Europe's experience with history has made it protective of human rights and wary of the way in which technology impacts on these rights, many APEC countries do not share this concern. Instead, many of the APEC countries as described above in Part III(A) do not have a strong legal history of protecting the right to privacy per se and are instead rapidly developing countries which are more concerned with the trade opportunities provided by electronic commerce.
Even countries which have existing data protection laws such as USA, Australia and Japan have chosen a market-oriented approach toward data protection which manifests itself in the private or co-regulatory model instead of the existing EU top down regulatory approach. While the EU does not rule out a "co-regulatory" approach, 67 the fact remains that in these countries, gaps remain in its privacy legislation with respect to the regulation of its private sector. For instance, in the case of Australia, the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) does not apply to small businesses that have less than AUD 3 million annual turnover. This is arguably a manifestation of the government's policy choice of preferring businesses over individual rights to privacy. Consequently, this has resulted in data protection laws that diverge from the EU model 68 and apart from the "Safe Harbour Agreement" with the USA, the European Commission has not formally recognized any of these countries as satisfying the "adequacy criterion".
This brings us to the intriguing question of whether the differences in rationales mean a different set of standards. For instance, the domestic implementation guidelines in Part 4 do not require any particular means of implementing the Framework but merely provide that there are several options for giving effect to the Framework "including legislative, administrative, industry self-regulation" and that the Framework is meant to be implemented in a flexible manner.
No central enforcement body is required save that Member Economies should consider taking steps to establish access points or mechanisms. 73 As for remedies, paragraph 38 states it should include an appropriate array of remedies such as redress and the ability to stop a violation from continuing but does not stipulate that legislative remedies must be put in place. 69 Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, New Zealand and USA. 70 The Openness Principle states: "There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the data controller." The commentary by the expert group, online: < http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html> explains at paragraph 57 that "it must be possible in practice to acquire information about the collection, storage or use of personal data. Regular information from data controllers on a voluntary basis, publication in official registers of descriptions of activities concerned with the processing of personal data, and registration with public bodies are some, though not all, of the ways by which this may be brought about. The reference to means which are 'readily available' implies that individuals should be able to obtain information without unreasonable effort as to time, advance knowledge, travelling, and so forth, and without unreasonable cost. 
As regards cross border data flow, this was an issue that was debated extensively. While the nine Privacy Principles were announced in November 2004, the original version was silent on the transfer of personal information between APEC economies or to non-APEC countries. Annex 1 to the draft Framework stipulated three areas for future discussion in 2005. They were the possibility of sharing information among APEC Member Economies via access points within each Member Economy; cross border co-operation between privacy investigation and enforcement agencies; and the development and recognition of organizations' cross border privacy codes across the APEC region.
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It was only at the Second APEC Implementation Seminar at Korea in September 2005 75 that agreement was reached on this missing section and the draft was then forwarded to APEC authorities for formal endorsement. This final version (which incorporated the three areas highlighted in Annex 1 of the 2004 draft) was approved in September 2005.
As it stands in its final version, 76 the APEC Privacy Framework 2004, unlike the Directive, does not forbid data exports to countries without APEC compliant laws.
The APEC Privacy Framework 2004 in fact emphasizes that while it is important to have mechanisms to facilitate responsible and accountable cross border data transfers and effective privacy protections, Member Economies should endeavor not to create "unnecessary barriers to cross border information flows, including unnecessary administrative and bureaucratic burdens for businesses and consumers". 77 One writer states that this section puts to rest fears that the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 was intended to create a data protection bloc which is antagonistic to the EU's adequacy requirements. 78 However, the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 differs in two aspects which have been covered by previous international agreements. The Instead, APEC appears to be more interested in the exploration of alternative ways of regulating cross border transfer of data instead of the traditional top-down regulatory method. This will be examined in more detail in the next section. One of the greatest strengths of the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 is that it was drafted squarely in the e-commerce age unlike the Directive which was drafted before the Internet boom. While the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 has been criticized as "having a bias towards [the] free flow of information over privacy protection", 79 it is perhaps an inevitable conclusion when one considers where the APEC economies are coming from. APEC is primarily a forum for trade related interests. Of paramount concern would be how to manage data transfers that are the life blood of global commerce in a manner that respects privacy and yet does not unduly burden organizations.
It is submitted that the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 attempts to strike a practical balance which is useful for individuals and businesses. It chooses to focus on aspects of privacy protection that are of most importance to international commerce such as preventing the misuse of personal information rather than broadly protecting the right of privacy per se. This is illustrated in the First Principle of Preventing Harm. The commentary relating to this principle states that one of the primary objectives of the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 is to prevent misuse of personal information and consequent harm to individuals, and that remedies for such infringements should be proportionate to the likelihood and severity of the harm caused. While the choice of establishing this as a principle has been described as "bizarre", 80 it is respectfully submitted that by starting off with this principle, the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 is in fact sending a clear message that it is positioning itself as neutral and balanced. This is in contrast to the high standard that the Directive sets out for its Member States that it deems necessary for protecting fundamental human rights such as privacy. 81 Another interesting principle not found explicitly in the other international instruments is that of the ninth Principle of Accountability. This principle recognizes that business models often require information transfers between different types of organizations in different locations with varying relationships. This imposes duties on the personal information controller such as ensuring that the appropriate consent is given or exercising due diligence to ensure that the recipient person or organization will protect the information consistent with the principles in the APEC Privacy Framework 2004. This principle has been described as being the most important innovation in the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 as it takes the position that "accountability should follow the data". That is, once an organization has collected personal information, it remains accountable for the protection of that data despite the fact that it may be passed on to another organization or jurisdiction.
This means that in the example set out in the Introduction of this article, that US Amazon would continue to be responsible for the personal data collected from its German customer regardless of whether it uses the personal data internally ie within USA or with its Japanese branch or externally with its suppliers whether they are located in USA or elsewhere. This is in contrast to other instruments, such as the Directive which focus on controlling the flow of cross border data, 82 a concept that may not fit neatly with the way businesses function in our current age.
For instance, one of the recognized exceptions in the Directive for cross border data transfers to countries which do not meet the "adequacy" requirement is when a controller adduces adequate safeguards for the individual's privacy and fundamental rights. Article 26(2) specifies that such "safeguards may in particular result from appropriate contractual clauses" [Emphasis added] which the EU Commission may approve and which Member States would then have to comply with.
Thus, in 2001, the EU Commission approved two sets of standard contractual clauses 83 which were then thought to provide a favourable solution to companies seeking to transfer data outside the EU or the European Economic Area. These clauses, however, proved to have shortcomings and the take up rate was slower than expected. For example, both parties in the transfer process were deemed to be jointly and severally liable to the individual and the data exporter was required in cases of sensitive personal data to provide a warranty to the individual concerned. In 2004, the EU Commission approved a new set of contractual clauses. 84 The alternative clauses provide a more equitable split of liability as parties are now only liable for their own breaches and there is overall more flexibility for the organizations concerned. 85 However, the fact remains that a contract still needs to be in place between all exporters and importers and this may not be the most suitable arrangement for multinational organizations which need to transfer data internally. Thus, the EU Commission's attention has recently been focused on the use of binding corporate rules (BCRs) to govern internal transfers within multinational organizations. that businesses can take to pioneer this development 86 (rather than calling for work on standard contractual clauses).
Therefore, while APEC Privacy Framework 2004 does not explicitly address the issue of cross border data transfer, it does call for co-operative development of cross border privacy rules in Part B of the Framework. In this way, the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 is still able to address the problems that corporations face as regards data transfer and benefit from the lessons that the EU has learnt through trial and error.
As for the weaknesses of the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 this can be grouped into two categories. The first relates to the nature of the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 as a legally binding instrument. The second relates to the principles contained in the Framework.
As regards the first weakness, the criticisms relating to the lack of a central enforcement body and the potential for variances in implementation are valid and are recognized by APEC itself. Section 39 of the Framework provides that Member Economies should make known the status of their domestic implementation through periodic updates in their Individual Action Plan reports. Furthermore, it encourages Member Economies to participate in sharing information, surveys and research as well as cross border co-operation in investigation and enforcement. 88 This is heartening as it suggests that future improvements are at least under consideration and that APEC is aware of its limitations as a voluntary grouping.
As regards the second category of weakness, this is perhaps the more troubling set. Professor Graham Greenleaf, who has written extensively on the drafting of the APEC Privacy Framework 2004, 89 has noted the weakness in basing the APEC Privacy Framework on the OECD Guidelines which are more than 20 years old. For example, the OECD Guidelines do not include any principles dealing explicitly with identifiers, automated processing or deletion of data.
Furthermore, Professor Greenleaf is of the view that the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 is weaker than the existing OECD Guidelines because of the missing OECD Principles of Purpose Specification, Data Export Limitation and Openness. As regards Purpose Specification, arguably, this is implied by the Notice Principle read together with the Choice Principle and Uses of Personal Information Principle. As shown in Annex A, the core value embodied by the Purpose Specification Principle is that of ensuring that personal information 86 should be collected for specified, lawful or legitimate purpose and not be processed incompatibly with those purposes. 90 Similarly, the Data Export Limitation Principle was replaced by a conscious choice of the Principle of Accountability which as described above is an approach more in line with modern business practices and the stated purpose of the APEC Privacy Framework 2004.
However, it is disappointing that the Openness Principle was dropped. Without this right, it is difficult for an individual to ascertain the existence and the nature of the data held by organizations about him or her. A related development during the Symposium at Vietnam in February 2006 was that while a template for the Individual Action Plans (IAPs) was endorsed by the E-Commerce Steering Group and a timeframe November 2006 was set for the filing of these reports, it was clarified that the IAP did not apply to e-government related matters although a government can choose to report on these matters if it chooses to.
91 This is a strange development as the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 is not limited to the private sector and even states expressly that "The APEC Privacy Framework applies to persons or organizations in the public and private sectors who control the collection, holding, processing, use, transfer or disclosure of personal information."
92 This action only serves to increase concerns that a culture of governmental secrecy is being propagated.
Additionally, Professor Greenleaf is of the view that the elevation of "choice" as a separate principle in the APEC Privacy Framework, in contrast with the existing international instruments, facilitates the commodification of privacy. Professor Greenleaf cautions against the interpretation that individual consent can override the other Principles.
While the writer agrees with Professor Greenleaf's conclusion that the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 is probably inadequate as the definitive set of privacy principles for Asia Pacific countries, the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 is perhaps not intended to be such a vehicle. The Foreword to the Framework puts its objective plainly, it is to "enable regional data transfers [that] will benefit consumers, businesses and governments". Paragraph 4 of the Preamble goes on to state that the Framework is "an important tool in encouraging the development of appropriate information privacy protections and ensuring the free flow of information in the Asia Pacific region."
Seen from this context, the Choice Principle read together with the Notice Principle make perfect sense to the consumer and the business or government involved. It is formulated specifically to address the problems that might arise from economic aspects of global trade. Section 12 of the Framework endorses a flexible approach and leaves the details of the implementation to each Member Economy. Accordingly, it appears that the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 vis-à-vis the Directive is a completely different creature given its underlying rationales, objectives and emphasis on aspects of informational privacy principles. 
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IV. At the Crossroads -The Singaporean Experience
What does the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 mean for its Member Economies? How are the Member Economies going to implement its principles into their domestic legislation? It is perhaps a little too early to say as the first IAPs have yet to be filed.
Nevertheless, it would be helpful to examine the initial responses of its Member Economies toward the APEC Privacy Framework in order to predict what kind of long term effect it is likely to have.
Singapore is tabula rasa in that it does not have a general and comprehensive data protection law in force. The right of privacy is not explicitly recognized in its Constitution. Singapore is also not a signatory to international conventions recognizing the right of privacy such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 93 neither is it bound by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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At the same time, Singapore is keen to position itself as an international ecommerce hub. As stated by the government ministry in charge (Infocomm Development Authority, "IDA") on its website, "One of IDA's key roles is to develop the Singapore infocommunications industry into a key engine of growth for the economy". 95 For instance, IDA released its 5 th Infocomm Technology Roadmap on 8 March 2005 which highlighted the potential of sensor technology, biocomputing, nanotechnology and other emerging technologies. The use of sentient technologies is also envisaged to enhance the quality of life such as smart systems to sense and remind elderly patients at home to take their medication and tracking systems, biosensors and wearables that will create more exciting lifestyles in smart homes and entertainment applications for the masses. 96 The latest programme unveiled by the IDA is called Intelligent Nation 2015 (iN2015). 97 It is an ambitious plan to transform key economic sectors, government and society through the use of infocommunications.
Singapore 
A. Introduction to Singapore's Legal System
Singapore's legal system is based on the English common law.
The current position in Singapore is that under common law, an enforceable right to privacy does not exist.
One writer 99 summarizes the position succinctly as follows: assuming that privacy is protected by four related groups of torts that deal with the unreasonable intrusion on the seclusion of another -the appropriation of another's name or likeliness, the unreasonable publicity given to another's private life and the publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the publicthere are a few causes of action that may arise in respect of each category.
For instance, in respect of the intrusion into seclusion or solitude, trespass to the person (assault, battery and false imprisonment), trespass to land, nuisance, harassment and even the intentional infliction of nervous shock may be relevant. For the second category, the tort of passing off and registered trade mark infringement may be used. For the third category, an action in equity to protect confidential information can be used to protect against unwanted publicity for private facts. For the final category, defamation and malicious or injurious falsehood are the main actions that come into play.
These, however, suffer from limitations, as obviously certain conditions have to be met before a cause of action can arise. The law of private nuisance, for example, is traditionally a tort against the enjoyment of land under English law.
The House of Lords reaffirmed in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd
100 that a person must have an interest in the land to have a standing to sue. The tort of trespass is likewise based on one's property right.
The tort of harassment, however, does not suffer from such limitations. For instance, in Malcomson Nicholas Hugh Betram v Naresh Kumar Mehta 101 the tort of harassment was accepted by the Singapore Court as a valid cause of action to deal with interfering acts that did not arise from the Plaintiffs' interest in land. 102 In this case, the Defendant was employed as an Assistant Vice President of the Plaintiffs. The first Plaintiff was the Chief Executive Officer. The employment did not go well and the Defendant left the company. Thereafter, for about a year, the Defendant made and sent numerous telephone calls and emails to the Plaintiffs. The Defendant managed to obtain the first Plaintiff's home address and sent him a congratulatory card close to the anniversary of the death of the first Plaintiff's son.
In his judgment for the Plaintiffs, then Judicial Commissioner, Lee Seiu Kin observed:
103 "life can be unbearable for the person who finds himself the object of attention of one who is determined to make use of these modern devices to harass. That person's mobile phone can be ringing away at all times and in all places. He may get a flood of SMS messages, which can now be conveniently sent out by computer via email… I do not believe that it is not possible for the common law to respond to this need. In Singapore we live in one of the most densely populated countries in the world."
However, while the tort of harassment goes some way toward protecting privacy in the sense of the right to be left alone, it is obviously not satisfactory as a data protection regime. It does not address issues such as providing individuals with control over the use and disclosure of their personal information or other core principles such as the fair collection and processing of data. (See earlier discussion in Part II(C)(3).) This comment applies equally to the other categories of causes of action.
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Turning to legislation in force in Singapore, as stated earlier, there is no general privacy or data protection legislation.
There are, however, many statutes that touch upon the processing of personal data in specific contexts. For instance, information relating to governmental matters is expressly protected from unauthorized disclosure under the Official Secrets Act (Cap 213). The Computer Misuse Act (Cap 50A) makes it an offence to obtain unauthorized access to computer material, modify it or use computer material without authorization. 105 Sector specific statutes that deal with secrecy and disclosure provisions apply to the private sector as well, for instance the Banking Act (Cap 19) and the Legal Professions Act (Cap 161). In total, about 161 separate statutes have provisions that touch upon secrecy and disclosure provisions. 106 However, "data protection" provisions in Singapore have traditionally taken the approach of regulating only the common forms of "processing" such as collection and disclosure. Issues such as rights to access and correction, accuracy, retention and data security are not addressed by most of the existing laws.
It was only with the emergence of e-commerce that businesses and governmental bodies in Singapore became aware of the issues of data protection. The first piece of relevant regulation albeit a voluntary code was issued in 1998 by the National Internet Advisory Committee (NIAC). This was the "E-Commerce Code for the Protection of Personal information and Communications of Consumers of Internet Commerce". The Code was adopted as part of a voluntary accreditation scheme called CaseTrust for consumer businesses.
It was around this period that the Directive and its influence on international legislation became apparent. The NIAC thus started work on a new code that would specifically address the requirements of the Directive. The NIAC released a new code entitled the Model Data Protection Code for the Private Sector in 2002 (Model Code). 107 The Model Code is modelled after the Canadian Standards Association's Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information (CSA Code) which, in turn, is based on the OECD Guidelines. 108 The Model Code, which is organized around ten data protection principles establishes the minimum standards for how personal data may be managed and processed by private sector organizations. The Code achieves this by defining and imposing limits and restrictions on the processing of such data.
The Model Code is currently in use in a voluntary data protection scheme coordinated by the National Trust Council which is a co-operation between the government and the industry. The National Trust Council evaluates and nominates companies to act as Authorised Code Owners. These Authorised Code Owners then evaluate other companies and award them with the "Trustsg" trust mark if they fulfil the criteria set out in the Model Code.
The NIAC report 109 further stressed the need for a harmonized, comprehensive data protection regime in Singapore as proliferation of data protection regimes and practices is confusing to consumers and makes monitoring and auditing by relevant authorities difficult. On the other hand, harmonized regimes translate into lower operational costs for global businesses.
The NIAC Committee also examined the different models of enforcement and compliance although this was strictly outside the ambit of the NIAC Committee's study 110 and concluded that a comprehensive and co-regulatory data protection model was the most compelling model for Singapore to adopt. It is interesting to note that the NIAC in its report had specifically stated that the Model Code is meant only as an interim measure.
As it stands today, it is unlikely that Singapore will pass the adequacy requirement imposed by the Directive due to the fragmented nature of its legislation, common law and voluntary codes of conduct and the lack of enforcement options. 
B. Current and Future Developments
There is an increasing concern voiced by the public about the use and processing of their personal data. This has been acknowledged by the Government.
At the Parliament sitting on 14 February 2006, the Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts, Mr Lee Boon Yang was asked whether privacy laws would be introduced in Singapore. 112 The Minister replied stating that "the Government recognises the increasing importance and impact of data protection in Singapore and the need to protect a person's personal data and prevent the possibility of misuse of personal information or identity theft" and that the Government recognizes that "an effective data protection regime will be an important pillar to develop Singapore's position as a trusted IT-hub. It will also be a critical factor in building trust between consumers and businesses for the adoption of new technologies and services (such as electronic transactions, biometrics and RFID)." "I agreed that we must take a comprehensive approach. On 13 Feb 06, I informed the House that the government is already reviewing Singapore's data protection regime and assessing the suitability of various data protection models … I would like to reassure the House that the government recognises the importance and impact of data protection on Singaporeans. We cannot shut out new technologies including those that can be abused. We have to strike a right balance between facilitating the adoption of new technologies and protecting personal data."
A follow up inquiry with the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts (MICA) 115 led to an updated statement as follows:
"MICA and IDA are currently reviewing the issue of data protection. MICA and IDA are working with the relevant agencies in the private and public sectors, to assess the suitability and effectiveness of various data protection regulatory models for Singapore, and will be announcing the updates sometime this year."
As at the date of this article, the recommendations and press release have yet to be released.
It was reported in 2006 that Singapore was joining Australia, Canada and USA in a study group on information sharing and cross border co-operation as regards the APEC Privacy Framework 2004.
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In May 2007, the Bioethics Advisory Committee released a report with its recommendations on the treatment of personal information in biomedical research.
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While the regulation of biomedical data is a specialized area, it is interesting to note that the first recommendation is for the relevant authorities to consider establishing a comprehensive statutory framework relating to the use and protection of personal data in biomedical research which would also take into account issues relating to the transfer of personal information to a third party and should provide judicial remedies and sanctions for such breaches.
118 This is balanced with the Committee's position of the need to facilitate the flow of information, a similar approach to the one taken in the APEC Privacy Framework 2004. For instance, section 3.4 of the Report states that "both regulators and the public should understand that the objective of the regime is to facilitate (rather than limit) the appropriate use of personal information [Emphasis added] through the provision of proper safeguards. Regulators…should guard against a disproportionate emphasis on restrictive requirements under the regime…" The Report also notes that Singapore does not have an existing statutory framework for the protection of personal information and observes that "a legal regime for personal information protection could provide a general framework for public engagement and for policy development."
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These are all encouraging signs that there is an increasing awareness of the need for policy development regarding the protection of personal data and privacy and that there will be continuing work on these issues in Singapore. From the statements issued by the Minister, the NIAC and the Bioethics Advisory Committee, it is highly possible that a comprehensive data protection model will be recommended in the upcoming report. is also non-prescriptive as regards cross border data flows, again domestic implementation will invariably highlight this issue and it would be strange to ignore this particular aspect. For instance, as discussed in Part IV(B), Singapore is currently in the process of reviewing its current legislation and deciding whether or not it needs to implement comprehensive data protection legislation across the board. Singapore is also participating in a study relating to cross border co-operation.
B. An Emerging Dialogue
While the EU model is widely accepted as providing a comprehensive and high standard of data protection, even after ten years, harmonization within the EU is not yet complete. 120 It is not realistic for the EU to have to certify the adequacy of every non EU country's data protection laws, especially with globalization of trade and the emergence of e-commerce. As one writer comments, the EU is caught "… between a rock and a hard place: if properly implemented, the regime is likely to collapse from the weight of its cumbersome, bureaucratic procedures. Alternatively, it could well collapse because of large scale avoidance of its proper implementation due precisely to fears of such procedures."
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That being the case, would an international standard be the best way forward? There have been previous discussions on whether the data protection question should be taken up by the world's standards setting and certification bodies. The rationale behind this proposal is that privacy protection could be regarded as an 120 APEC's recognition of a set of principles based on OECD Guidelines is proof that there can be a common international consensus on what it means to treat personal information in a privacy-friendly manner. There is also an increasing awareness globally about the need to protect privacy and personal data in the interconnected and technologically advanced world that we live in.
Perhaps the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of the possibility of a global standard, be it by way of an international standard or a truly international convention, for data protection. While the process is not going to be easy or short, the APEC Privacy Framework 2004 is one step toward that final destination. 
